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documenta 
 
 
Introduction 
The May 2007 consultation on Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVAs) 
proposes six reforms to current legislation to be enacted via Legislative 
Reform Order (LRO).  This brief article outlines the six reform areas and 
discusses the key reforms against a background of the changes that have 
been seen in the insolvency “market” in recent years.  The reforms combine 
Cork’s practical approach to dealing with smaller debtors with current 
budgetary and administrative drivers and 20 years of experience of the IVA 
regime. 
 
The “market” driven logic for these reforms is clear.  Few commentators 
forecast the huge growth in IVA numbers following the Enterprise Act 2002 
changes to bankruptcy law.  Indeed, the death of the IVA was widely 
predictedb, yet the underlying growth in consumer credit and its attendant 
problems is clearly linked to both bankruptcy and IVA growthc. 
 
The reforms 
The six reforms proposed by The Insolvency Service fall into three categories: 
Substantive (1), Administrative (3), and Housekeeping (2). 
 
The substantive reform is the introduction of the SIVA, a pared down version 
of the IVA, designed to complement other insolvency vehicles and to address 
the needs of the “consumer” debtor.  The details of this are discussed in the 
next section but it is interesting to note that much of the SIVA was outlined in 
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Cork’s 1982 reportd, being proposed as a Debt Arrangement Order (DAO).  
Cork’s DAO was not enacted in 1986 but the logic of having a separate 
regime for professionals and traders (the IVA) and “consumer” debtors (the 
DAO) has not changed – today it is the huge number of cases that adds 
weight to the logic. 
 
The three administrative reforms echo Woolf’s civil justice reformse as they 
aim to reduce unnecessary paperwork from the court process and reduce 
costs, thus improving recoveries for creditors (we shall see……).  Exception 
reporting will be the norm with SIVA, FTVA (available only to un-discharged 
bankrupts) and IVA supervisors providing no routine paperwork (proposal etc) 
in the first instance and annual reports only where, in their judgement, factors 
exist that jeopardise the arrangement.  Supervisors retain the obligation to 
keep comprehensive files, producing them only where court intervention is 
applied for.  It will be interesting to see just how much cost this saves for the 
IP – court fees for sure but the time spent in preparing documentation will still 
be there.  These reforms recognise that court papers are rarely referred to in 
practice and that the vast majority of cases proceed under the Insolvency Act 
2000 reform, without benefit of an interim order.f 
 
The third of the administrative reforms also flows from the Insolvency Act 
2000 where the opportunity was given for non-IPs to act as nominees and 
supervisors of voluntary arrangements.  Such persons would be authorised by 
RPBs or the Secretary of State.  Since 2000 there has been little actual 
demand for this from individuals and the confusion in the legislation is pointed 
to as a reason.  This reform would clarify the position whereby RPBs could 
authorise individuals to supervise IVAs or CVAs or both.  It is thought that the 
IVA authorisation will be popular amongst debt advisors currently unable to 
act personally. 
 
Finally, two housekeeping issues:  The long awaited repeal of the Deeds of 
Arrangement Act 1914 (another Cork recommendation) since this regime has 
fallen into complete disuse, and the re-structuring of the oft-amended Part VIII 
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of the Insolvency Act 1986.  Neither of these minor reforms appears to be 
contentious. 
 
The SIVA 
SIVAs will be restricted to debtors having undisputed (and unsecured) 
liabilities of less than £75,000 and will benefit from the streamlining reforms 
that require only an application to court rather than full documentation.  The 
monetary limit is the only feature that indicates that this procedure is intended 
for “consumer” debtors although it can be seen that micro-businesses could 
also fall within its ambit.  An estimated 80% of IVAs taken out in 2005 would 
have fallen within this figureg with average indebtedness of £40,000.  Cork’s 
proposed DAO limit was £10,000 but inflation and increased levels of debt 
over the intervening 25 years have had their toll. 
 
SIVAs also dispense with the interim order under S.253IA1986, following the 
clear choices made by nominees since interim orders were made optional 
under IA2000.  Clearly, where a threat from a creditor exists the IP can opt for 
the full IVA procedure and benefit from the interim order protection whilst the 
proposal is being considered. 
 
More contentious appear to be the dilution of creditor rights envisaged in a 
SIVA.  These include the inability to table amendments to proposals, the 
absence of a physical creditors’ meeting and acceptance of proposals by 
simple majority (rather than 75% as required for full IVAs).  In addition 
creditors will have to file claims within 90 days, presumably, failure to do this 
will disqualify the debt for both voting and recovery purposes. 
 
Many of these reforms can be seen to have positive cost implications for 
those providing IVAs and SIVAs.  It remains to be seen if lower fees will 
interfere with the business models of the AIM listed “IVA factories” launched 
over the past few years.  IVA growth rates are unlikely to continue to increase 
at the rate seen since 2005h and so a consolidation in the industry is possible.  
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Leaner and fitter organisations are likely to survive whilst those reliant on high 
revenues will disappear. 
 
The reforms also recognise that experience of IVAs over the years has 
produced a fairly standardised proposal structure for “consumer” debtors.  
Most proposals now anticipate likely amendments to duration, windfall gains, 
asset re-valuation and fee scrutiny procedures that creditors have tabled in 
the past.  Recent agreement between the British Bankers Association, on 
behalf of key lenders, and various IVA providers should mean a code of 
conduct and self-policing for IVAs in the futurei.  Thus, the reforms rely on the 
industry players to work within their agreed codes of conduct and for the 
market to police “good practice”.  The continued monitoring of the IVA 
marketplace by the Insolvency Service and by those providing meeting and 
administrative services to lenders will be an essential part of this process. 
 
Authorised supervisors 
 
It is second time around for the proposal to allow “authorised persons”, who 
are not qualified and licensed IPs, to act as nominees and supervisors of IVAs 
and SIVAs.  The reform was part of the IA2000 but has found little uptake 
since the onus is on RPBs to authorise individuals to act in voluntary 
arrangements.  A swift review of a number of key RPB website reveals that no 
separate licensing route for voluntary arrangement authorisations exists – 
only full membership.  The consultation document reveals that the IA2000 
was equivocal with its definition of voluntary arrangements and that the 
current reform makes it clear that RPBs and the Secretary of State may 
authorise individuals to act in individual or corporate arrangements or both. 
 
Encouragement of price competition from other debt professionals may be 
behind this clarification.  However, such authorised individuals would need to 
undergo education; training and qualification regimes, secure bonding etc and 
so fixed costs may well be high – too high, perhaps for effective rivalry? 
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Cork saw the need to protect debtors and creditors from a small number of 
rogues acting as IPs and whilst his report outlined, substantially, the RPB and 
qualification structure that came into force in 1986 it also warned against 
creating a restrictive trade practice (a monopoly).  Perhaps this reform will 
encourage charitable bodies to enter the fray – but at what cost?  It can be 
argued that an IP can offer wide and more general advice on debt problems 
whilst specialists may only be able to offer SIVAs. 
 
Risk analysis 
Legislative change via the LRO procedure requires certain tests to be met.  
These tests approximate the scrutiny that a full Bill would receive in its 
committee stages and include: proportionality of benefits and costs, fair 
balance to all parties, desirability and achievability.  Importantly the tests also 
include a risk analysis to ensure that necessary protections remain and that 
individuals do not lose rights and freedoms. 
 
The key risks embodied in the proposals appear to centre on the protection of 
creditors (both specific creditors in IVA cases and the credit community) and 
the protection of debtors from inappropriate advice. 
 
Much of the consultation’s reforms can be seen as a pragmatic deferral to 
market forces.  The reforms simply codify what is happening and facilitate 
efficiencies by removing little used procedural steps.  The SIVA framework 
simply mirrors practice in many “consumer” IVA cases.  If a key objective of 
the reforms is to make IVA administration more efficient (with the hope that 
this reduces costs) then this objective is likely to be achieved. 
 
There are, however, costs to these reforms and these fall largely on creditors 
and, to a lesser extent, on RPBs.  Creditors, in particular, are placed in a 
front-line monitoring role in order that court intervention (and production of 
paperwork) can be triggered.  They can no longer rely on court scrutiny (real 
or imagined).  Creditors, too, will be best placed to monitor fee levels and 
costs.  Creditors’ incentives are always felt to be linked to increasing returns 
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but they will lose certain rights to influence return levels in over 80% of VA 
cases.  In reality, creditor influence will be at the more general level of the 
industry code of conduct rather than the level of the individual case. 
 
If a key objective is to encourage competition in the provision of IVAs then the 
future is less clear and the outcome less reliant on a legislative change alone.  
The market forces that have produced the current situation of dominance by a 
few well-funded and focused providers will change over time.  There may be 
less competition as the credit boom softens and industry consolidation occurs.  
Meanwhile, individual debtors will be faced with a bewildering array of choice 
in “debt solutions” and may not be best served by entertaining any kind of 
insolvency regime at all. 
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